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The Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is the largest U.S. welfare program, 
with twenty-four million low-income Americans receiving $60 billion of disbursals in 
2009.  Through the EITC, working Americans with little or no tax liability can receive up 
to nearly $6,000 in refundable tax credits each year.  Over the past two decades, 
policymakers have increasingly favored the EITC over direct-transfer welfare programs, 
citing its lower administrative expense (as recipients “self-certify” by filing taxes) and 
incentives for recipients to work.  Despite its political appeal, the EITC suffers deep 
structural flaws.  Largely because EITC claimants have little guidance in navigating the 
difficult filing process, they are subject to high rates of IRS audits and rescission of 
benefits with penalties and interest.  This proliferation of EITC-related controversies has 
created an immense need for legal assistance, yet low-income tax law largely remains a 
peripheral concern within the legal aid community.  
In this article, we suggest a comprehensive and achievable set of reforms that the 
IRS and legal services organizations can enact to improve the EITC’s efficacy and 
fairness.  We first describe how the complexity of EITC eligibility criteria creates a 
tremendous burden for low-income Americans, as they frequently lack advice in tax filing 
and cannot afford legal representation in the event of a controversy with the IRS.  We 
then outline measures that the IRS should implement to make the EITC more accessible 
and understandable to those qualifying for the credit, reducing the chance of an audit 
and loss of benefits. In particular, we focus on improving the tax filing process, making 
EITC audits more manageable for recipients, instituting less adversarial procedures for 
EITC-related Tax Court proceedings, and changing certain organizational structures 
within the IRS.  Finally, we propose several practical ways that the legal aid community 
can enhance its support of EITC recipients confronting an IRS audit or Tax Court action.  
Most importantly, we argue that EITC assistance warrants greater Congressional 
funding and higher strategic and budgetary priority within legal aid organizations, given 
that the EITC is now far larger than the direct-transfer welfare programs on which legal 
aid lawyers have traditionally focused. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, College of William and Mary government professor Christopher 
Howard published The Hidden Welfare State.
1
  Howard’s book described a phenomenon 
of which many savvy observers were already aware: a prominent and growing proportion 
of American social policy was being implemented through the tax code, using tax 
expenditures, via mechanisms such as refundable tax credits.
2
  Programs such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, and the Home Interest 
Mortgage deduction all served social welfare objectives, but did so stealthily, through tax 
provisions rather than cumbersome eligibility regimes associated with traditional welfare.  
In this article, we explore one of the programs that Howard’s study emphasized: 
the Earned Income Tax Credit.  The EITC has, since the mid-1990s, been a prominent 
component of the American social welfare landscape.  As we detail in Part II below, 
annual EITC expenditures dwarf the funds disbursed through traditional welfare 
programs such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) program.  And, 
as a number of commentators have noted, the use of the tax system to administer the 
EITC has led to a number of pathologies not associated with traditional welfare.  Writing 
in 1995, Professor Anne Alstott noted that “[t]he tax system's limitations render the EITC 
inherently inaccurate, unresponsive, and vulnerable to fraud and error in ways that 
traditional welfare programs are not.”
3
  More recent commentators have focused on ways 
in which tax administration produces onerous and arguably unfair burdens for the low-




Our article chronicles the burdens that the EITC imposes upon low-income 
claimants and examines the implications of these burdens.  In particular, we focus on how 
the legal aid community should respond to the EITC’s status as the nation’s preeminent 
social welfare program.  Two recognitions are crucial to our project.  The first is that the 
EITC’s tax-based regime is uniquely burdensome for low-income taxpayers.  The 
program uses self-certification via the filing of a tax return, making taxpayers responsible 
for determining and verifying their eligibility.  Having provided no ex ante assistance in 
determining eligibility, the program then employs a harsh, and arguably punitive, array of 
auditing and adjudicative techniques that challenge taxpayer eligibility ex post.  
Taxpayers unable to prove their eligibility to the IRS in a variety of correspondence-
intensive and often adversarial processes are called upon to repay the benefit they 
received, with interest and penalties.
5
  This system is uniquely challenging to low-income 
taxpayers who may lack the skills required to navigate the tax return and audit processes.  
The second key recognition upon which we build is the EITC’s centrality in the 
American social welfare landscape.  We argue that the legal aid community has allowed 
the “hidden welfare state” to remain hidden, moving too slowly to develop a robust 
                                                     
1 CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE (1997). 
2 Id. at 3 (noting that tax expenditures devoted to social welfare projects cost approximately $400 
billion in 1995). 
3 Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare 
Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 535 (1995). 
4 See, e.g., Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR. 
L. REV. 351 (2002); George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals 
to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL. 225 (1994). 
5 See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 
57, 105 (2009). 
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capacity to assist low-income taxpayers in navigating the vagaries of the EITC.  While 
the legal aid community has not wholly neglected the EITC—programs such as the Legal 
Aid Society of Orange County’s development of the I-CAN! software are laudable 
initiatives
6
—it has not accorded the EITC the degree of attention one would expect for 
the nation’s largest welfare program.  The result is a status quo in which low-income 
workers must navigate the complexities of the nation’s largest welfare program with a 
bare minimum of legal assistance. 
In the pages that follow, we argue both that the EITC’s administration should be 
reformed to make it better suited to the needs of its low-income clientele, and that the 
legal aid community should respond to the centrality of the EITC in American welfare 
policy by devoting greater resources and energy to assisting EITC claimants.  We 
proceed in four parts.  Part II describes the rise of the EITC and details the various 
aspects of tax administration that render the EITC difficult for low-income taxpayers.  
Part III takes an internal approach to the problem, discussing and analyzing various 
structural reforms to the program and IRS administration that would serve to soften the 
program’s harsh edges.  Part IV takes an external approach, discussing steps that 
Congress and the legal aid community can and should take in response to the EITC’s 
ever-growing prominence.  Part V concludes.  
II. ADMINISTERING WELFARE THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM: 
BACKGROUND TO THE EITC 
In this part, we discuss the difficulties that the EITC poses for low-income 
individuals who seek the credit. In particular, we focus on how the program’s tax-based 
administration presents unique legal challenges for low-income individuals that are 
different from those associated with traditional welfare.  To do so, this part proceeds in 
three sections.  First, we provide background to the EITC, focusing on the program’s 
history and structure.  We emphasize the unique choice to use applicant self-certification 
via the submission of a tax return as the means for determining each claimant’s eligibility 
for the credit.  Second, we discuss the costs and benefits of the EITC’s reliance on self-
certification.  We focus in particular on how self-certification imposes significant burdens 
on claimants, who are required to certify their compliance with complex eligibility 
guidelines and given minimal assistance in doing so.  Third, we discuss the IRS’s audit, 
appeal, and Tax Court processes with a focus on how ill-fitted these processes are to the 
skills and life experiences of unrepresented, low-income EITC recipients.  The account 
we provide in this section illustrates that the EITC’s use of tax administration—both 
through reliance on self-certification to make ex ante eligibility determinations and 
through reliance on audits and Tax Court to make ex post judgments of taxpayer 
compliance—imposes legal obstacles on low-income workers that merit the attention of 
the legal aid community. 
A. History and Structure 
The EITC was enacted in 1975 as a relatively modest wage-subsidy and payroll-
tax offset for low-income workers, implemented largely to provide a degree of economic 
relief in the face of a significant recession.
7
  The credit was not initially viewed as a 
major piece of social policy.  It was implemented as a temporary measure and renewed 
                                                     
6 See infra Part IV.A.  
7 See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON 
AMERICA’S FAMILIES 15, 25 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds. 2001). 
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annually for several years in the mid-1970s before policymakers began to recognize its 
potential as a long-term fixture on the American social policy landscape.
8
  The credit had 
a number of features that made it politically and ideologically attractive to policymakers 
in an era when the orthodoxies of the welfare state were increasingly questioned by 
commentators such as NYU professor of politics and public policy Lawrence Mead.
9
  
Most notable is the fact that, unlike the cash disbursements of traditional welfare, the 
EITC could be framed as tax relief that provided work incentives to families.
10
  That is, 
the EITC was successful in large part because politicians viewed it as “a work-oriented 
alternative to existing welfare programs.”
11
 
The welfare reform movement that began in the late 1970s fundamentally 
transformed expectations of the EITC.  As Dennis Ventry explains: “the EITC would 
emerge from the welfare reform discussions at the end of the 1970s forever transformed.  
It would no longer constitute simply a modest work subsidy; rather it would represent an 
antipoverty device that could potentially raise the income of all working Americans 
above the poverty line.”
12
  The EITC gained increasing political salience, benefiting from 
a major expansion in 1986.
13
  In 1996, when the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Reconciliation Act replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) with 
short-term state-administered welfare under the TANF program, the EITC took on an 




Since 1994, federal spending on the EITC has been consistently higher than 
spending on traditional federal welfare programs such as AFDC and its successor, TANF.  
By fiscal year 2009, EITC benefits paid out to low income tax filers accounted for over 
$60 billion in federal spending, compared to under $25 billion in federal spending on 
TANF.
15
  To illustrate the long-term magnitude of this shift, EITC disbursals in 1980 
were approximately $5 billion, whereas AFDC outlays were approximately $18 billion.  
However, the winding path by which the EITC emerged as a major social welfare 
program has possibly obscured the program’s true significance from poverty lawyers.  
These lawyers have historically viewed welfare litigation as a significant aspect of their 
mission, but they have not widely adjusted their focus in recognition of the fact that a 
significant proportion of this nation’s welfare system is now administered through the tax 
code.  And this failure to acknowledge the importance of the tax code to low-income 
workers is a mistake: as the following sub-sections illustrate, the EITC requires millions 
                                                     
8 Id. at 25-26. 
9 See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA 
(1993) (criticizing American welfare state as giving rise to undeserving class of nonworking poor); 
LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1985) (arguing that 
welfare benefits should be conditioned on willingness to work). See generally BRENDON O’CONNOR, A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 93-238 (2004) (describing conservative attacks on 
the liberal welfare state and the emergence of a “conservative” welfare system). 
10 See Ventry, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing 1979 Joint Committee on Taxation report on the 
EITC).  
11 Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1261, 1266 (2007).  
12 Ventry, supra note 7, at 26. 
13 See id. at 32-34.  
14 Id. at 34.  
15 Urban Inst. & Brookings Inst., Tax Facts, TAX POLICY CENTER, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=266 (last visited July 12, 2011).  
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of low-income Americans to engage the tax system each year, imposing significant 
burdens on them in the form of a daunting application process and an often-punitive, 
exceedingly complex auditing regime.  
The challenges of applying for the EITC are a product of the fact that the credit is 
processed through the federal income tax system.
16
  Because the EITC operates as a 
refundable tax credit, in order to claim it, taxpayers file annual tax returns (even if they 
have no tax liability) and, in the process, use the credit to reduce their liability below 
zero.
17
  The amount that is claimed below zero is then paid to the taxpayer in the form of 
a tax refund.
18
  In this system, potential beneficiaries are responsible for both initially 
declaring their eligibility for the benefit and determining the size of the benefit to which 
they are entitled.  Taxpayers claiming refundable tax credits, like the EITC, typically 
have their returns subjected to routine, mechanical scrutiny for mathematical error.  The 
EITC’s reliance on applicant self-certification is arguably the program’s defining 
administrative feature, and is in stark contrast to the universal pre-certification regimes 
employed by traditional welfare programs.
19
  
The EITC’s method for calculating the refund claimed by an individual filer can 
be quite complex.
20
  In general, the potential size of the EITC that can be claimed by an 
individual filer varies based on the taxpayer’s income and the number of “qualifying 
children” that a claimant has.
21
  Specifically, the credit is calculated by multiplying the 
filer’s earned income by a credit percentage tied to “qualifying children” who are claimed 
as dependents by the filer.
22
  The credit then eventually flattens and phases out after 
certain earning thresholds have been reached.
23
  These general requirements are subject 
to exceptions and qualifications based on the nature of the income, the relationship with 
the children claimed, and the claimant’s marital and employment statuses.
24
  
B. Self-Certification: Costs and Benefits 
In this subpart we address both the advantages and disadvantages of employing 
the tax code to administer the EITC.  There are four benefits that EITC advocates often 
claim as a result of this administrative form: first, high participation rates among eligible 
                                                     
16 See Alstott, supra note 3, at 535 (noting that “because the EITC is a tax-based transfer program, 
it faces significant institutional constraints that are not present in traditional welfare programs.”) (emphasis 
added).  
17 See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Reforming Tax Incentives Into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits, in 
POLICY BRIEF 3-4 (Brookings Inst., Ser. No. 156, Aug. 2006) (arguing that more than one-third of American 
households do not have income tax liability in any given year).  
18 See id. (arguing that the optimal delivery mechanism for all socially valued incentives embedded 
in the tax code is the uniform refundable tax credit). 
19 See Ventry, supra note 11, at 1274-75; Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: 
Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (noting 
that EITC recipients “are not made to go through the eligibility and verification gauntlet in the same manner 
as other benefits’ recipients.”); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2005) (The EITC’s self-certification “is in sharp contrast with the 
universal practice in welfare programs, such as Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), in which the claimant must establish her eligibility to the satisfaction of a welfare bureaucracy 
before receiving any benefits.”). 
20 See generally Book, supra note 4, at 361-63 (explaining that the tax credit is measured by 
multiplying the taxpayer’s earned income up to a specific amount by a credit percentage). 
21 See I.R.C. § 32(b) (2006) (prescribing method for calculation of EITC). 
22 See Book, supra note 4, at 362. 
23 See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (describing the phase-out formula). 
24 See Book, supra note 4, at 362. 
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individuals; second, reduced administrative costs; third, reduced stigma for program 
participants; and fourth, the political advantage of enshrining entitlement programs in the 
tax code, rather than in highly visible and politically controversial direct expenditures.  
However, these advantages are not unqualified, and the EITC entails significant 
disadvantages as well.  As will be detailed below, these disadvantages involve significant 
burdens for the low-income workers who are expected to navigate the EITC’s byzantine 
eligibility apparatus with a minimum of legal assistance. 
First, the EITC boasts a higher participation rate than other social programs that 
provide support for low-income families.
25
  One commentator has claimed that the EITC 
can boast participation rates as high as eighty-nine percent.
26
  This is higher than 
comparable estimates for the Food Stamps Program, for instance, in which participation 
is currently estimated at seventy percent.
27
  Scholars generally attribute this increased 
participation rate to the EITC’s use of self-certification, which does away with time-
consuming and potentially humiliating visits to welfare offices.
28
  And, indeed, for many 
EITC proponents, the EITC’s high levels of participation are among the program’s most 
valuable features.
29
  However, it should be noted that there is a lack of empirical work 
definitively connecting the EITC’s pre-certification regime to its participation rate: it is 
possible, for instance, that the EITC enjoys high levels of participation because it targets 
low-income workers, who may be more likely to have the skills and initiative to apply for 
benefits than do those who are both destitute and unemployed.
30
  
Second, another putative advantage of self-certification is the EITC’s relatively 
low administrative costs when compared to traditional welfare programs, which typically 
require that potential recipients be pre-certified prior to the disbursement of benefits.
31
  
Pre-certification requires the programs’ administering agencies to employ a large number 
of street-level intake workers in field offices around the country.  Potential recipients 
typically must meet with these intake officials multiple times prior to certification, and 
then often have annual meetings for recertification.
32
  This stands in contrast with the 
self-certification process by which eligible individuals claim the EITC on their tax 
returns.  The result is that the EITC is administered at a dramatically lower overall cost 
than traditional welfare programs.  Scholars have estimated that the IRS is able to 
                                                     
25 See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Liebman, Who are the Ineligible EITC Recipients?, 4 NAT. TAX J. 1165, 
1183 n.34 (2000). 
26 Ventry, supra note 11, at 1265. 
27 See id.  
28 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010 (2004) (“The EITC has a high participation rate but also a high overpayment rate. 
These facts are likely due to the lack of a precertification process.”).  
29 See Zelenak, supra note 19, at 1915. 
30 However, TANF also includes work conditions, suggesting that the EITC’s work condition alone 
cannot explain its high participation rates. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54 UCLA 
L. REV. 373, 376 (2006) (describing TANF’s work requirements). 
31 See Alstott, supra note 3, at 534 (noting that advocates have argued that “because the EITC is 
part of the federal tax system, it is simpler and cheaper to administer than programs run by the welfare 
bureaucracy . . . .”). 
32 See Janet Holtzblatt, Choosing Between Refundable Tax Credits and Spending Programs, 93 
PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N 116, 119 (2000) (“Almost all food stamp applicants must visit a state office in 
person during regular business hours to apply for benefits. Further, all claimants must complete a lengthy 
application . . . and provide extensive documentation to support the claim. Over 40% of food stamp 
applicants make two or more trips to the state office to complete the initial application process.”) 
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administer the EITC at a total cost that is 1-2% of benefits paid out.
33
  This is 
substantially less than the rate for TANF, which is currently at ten percent of benefits 




Third, the EITC’s pre-certification regime may reduce the social stigma 
associated with traditional direct spending welfare programs, which require beneficiaries 
to engage in routine visits to welfare offices for face-to-face eligibility interviews.
35
  
However, there is a significant lack of empirical support for the proposition that the EITC 
is less stigmatizing than traditional welfare.  Scholars have noted that tax-based welfare 
may also contain stigmatizing effects.
36
  And recent outrage in conservative media circles 
about the fact that some taxpayers enjoy no (or negative) tax liability suggests that the tax 
system may be still susceptible to the stigmas associated with traditional welfare.
37
 
Finally, another claimed advantage of the EITC is that tax expenditures travel a 
different path through Congress than do direct outlays.  Because the amount of federal 
dollars spent annually on the EITC depends on the amount of benefits claimed by filers, 
the program does not require large outlays in the appropriations process through 
Congress.  Moreover, welfare benefits administered through the tax system are less 




Unfortunately, there are also substantial costs to administering welfare through 
the tax system.  The most prominent such cost is a massive non-compliance epidemic, as 
reliance on self-certification by applicants increases the potential for both deliberate fraud 
and inadvertent error.  The IRS estimates that for tax year 2004, between $9.6 billion and 
$11.4 billion in erroneous EITC payments were made, approximately a quarter of the 
$41.3 billion in EITC claims paid for that year.
39
  A 2002 study of EITC payments in tax 
year 1999 found similarly high rates of noncompliance, estimating that the IRS made 
between $8.5 billion and $9.9 billion in erroneous payments (between twenty-seven 
percent and thirty-two percent of that year’s total EITC payments).40  The fact that as 
much as a third of the program’s benefits are diverted to ineligible recipients suggests 
                                                     
33 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 19, at 1884. 
34 Id. at 1881-1882.  
35 See Alstott, supra note 3, at 534 (noting that EITC advocates have argued that administering the 
program through the tax system “affords greater dignity and privacy to beneficiaries.”); see also Nat’l 
Taxpayer Advocate, Running Social Programs Through The Tax System, 2 2009 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 75, 78, 
87 (2009).  
36 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 28, at 1004 n.152 (“[S]tigma effects may arise under the tax 
system as well.”); see also Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and 
Economic and Social Mobility, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1187, 1189 (2000) (“There are several possible 
explanations . . . including . . . employees’ unwillingness to inform the employer of EITC eligibility due to 
stigma effects . . . .”).  
37 See also, e.g., David Leonhardt, Yes, 47% of Households Owe No Taxes. Look Closer. N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B1 (describing how lack of tax liability of low-income Americans has “become a 
popular talking point on cable television and talk radio.”). 
38 See Jacob S. Hacker, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE 42-44 (2002) (arguing that “private social 
benefits” administered through the tax code “are often characterized by both low visibility and low 
traceability.”). 
39 Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit, Dep’t of the Treas., to 
Nancy A. Nakamura, Comm’r, Wage and Inv. Div., Internal Revenue Serv. 1 (Dec. 31, 2008). 
40 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME 
TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3 (2002). 
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that claims regarding the program’s relatively low administrative costs should be met 
with skepticism. 
A related cost involves the imposition of a filing requirement on millions of 
taxpayers who would otherwise not be obligated to file a tax return.  It is estimated that 
forty-seven percent of individual taxpayers do not have an obligation to file returns 
because they have either a zero or negative tax liability for the year.
41
  Also, many of the 
individuals who are forced to file tax returns to claim the benefits of the EITC lack the 
sophistication of wealthier taxpayers, and as a result, completing the return imposes a 
burden upon them.
42
  This burden is especially acute given the EITC’s complex 
eligibility requirements, which may exceed the capabilities of many low-income workers.  
In 1997, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) described the 
credit’s eligibility criteria as “nightmare of eligibility tests, requiring a maze of 
worksheets.”
43
  The Institute noted that application for the credit requires a claimant to 
consider: 
nine eligibility requirements; the number of qualifying children—taking 
into account relationship, residency and age tests, the taxpayer’s earned 
income—taxable and non-taxable; the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income 
(“AGI”); the taxpayer’s modified AGI; threshold amounts; phase out 
rates; and varying credit rates.
44
 
AICPA’s statement concluded that: 
While Congress and the IRS may expect that the AICPA and its 
members can comprehend the many pages of instructions and 
worksheets, it is unreasonable to expect those individuals entitled to the 
credit (who will almost certainly NOT be expert in tax matters) to deal 
with this complexity. Even our members, who tend to calculate the credit 
for taxpayers as part of their volunteer work, find this area to be 
extremely challenging. In fact, we have found that the EITC process can 
be a lot more demanding than completing the Schedule A – Itemized 
Deductions, which many of our members complete on a regular basis for 
their clients. 
That taxpayer confusion over these eligibility criteria is a widespread 
phenomenon, as illustrated by the fact that, in 1999, about $2.1 billion in erroneous EITC 
claims were made by taxpayers who should have employed a filing status of “married 
filing separately,” which renders a taxpayer automatically ineligible for the credit.45  The 
fact that such a large number of EITC claimants select a filing status that renders them 
automatically ineligible for the credit suggests widespread difficulty in navigating the 
credit’s complex eligibility criteria, and further indicates that the above-discussed non-
compliance epidemic is attributable, at least in part, to taxpayer confusion rather than 
deliberate fraud.  
                                                     
41 Roberton Williams, Who Pays No Income Tax?, 123 TAX NOTES 1583 (2009).  
42 See Yin et al., supra note 4, at 263-64.  
43 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Tax Simplification Recommendations, 97 
TNI 95-21 (1997). 
44 Id. 
45 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 40, app. at C-2. 
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Given these complexities, it is not surprising that many EITC claimants choose to 
have their returns prepared professionally.
46
  In tax year 2003, seventy-one percent of all 
EITC returns were prepared by a third party, and a higher proportion of EITC filers use 
paid preparers than do middle- and upper-income taxpayers.
47
  However, the fact that 
EITC filers rely so heavily on external preparation appears to expose them to 
incompetent or unscrupulous agents who, aware that the EITC can often result in a 
sizeable payout, promise large refunds as an incentive to use their services, and often 
issue predatory refund anticipation loans (“RALs”) to EITC claimants.
48
  In low-income 
communities, for instance, return preparation services have arisen to facilitate EITC 
claimants’ purchases at various retail outlets and car dealers.
49
  Such services have 
obvious incentives to deem any given taxpayer eligible for EITC, and, not surprisingly, 
paid preparers are associated with a troublingly high rate of erroneous EITC claims: so-
called “brokered non-compliance.”
50
  Moreover, these preparers are often fly-by-night in 
nature and, as such, are often no longer in business when their mistakes are discovered by 
IRS auditors.
51
  Taking a long-overdue step, the IRS published a rule in September 2010 
that requires paid preparers to register and comply with a set of competency standards.
52
  
It will be critical for the IRS to follow through with vigorous and uniform enforcement of 
this rule.  
Currently, too few EITC claimants are taking advantage of the IRS’s Volunteer 
Income Tax Assistance (“VITA”) program, which consists of trained community 
volunteers who offer free tax help to low- and middle-income individuals—typically, 
those making under $50,000 per year.
53
  Even though the VITA staff members are not tax 
professionals, several features of the program still make it a superior option to paid 
preparation for most EITC claimants.  First, VITA staff must undergo a rigorous training 
program and pass qualifying examinations in order to prepare returns for various 
individuals.  For example, passing a basic exam allows a volunteer to prepare most 
individual and family returns, but passing a more advanced exam is required to prepare 
more complicated returns, such as those involving higher education credits or self-
employment.  Second, there is a dual-layer review process in VITA preparations, in 
which the initial preparer’s work is always checked by a more experienced volunteer 
before the return is filed.  Finally, and most importantly, VITA is free, allowing the EITC 
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claimants to keep more of their entitlement benefits.  Paid preparation, by comparison, 
can cost EITC claimants hundreds of dollars.
54
   
For the purposes of this article, though, perhaps the most important drawback of 
the EITC’s tax administration derives from the fact that when EITC claimants—who are 
responsible for certifying their own eligibility—erroneously claim to be eligible, they are 
required to engage the IRS’s complex “deficiency process” encompassing 
correspondence audits, the IRS Office of Appeals, and United States Tax Courts.
55
  
Taxpayers who are unsuccessful in vindicating their claims through this daunting process 
are required to repay the benefit they have received, with interest, and often with 
penalties as well.
56
  This susceptibility to legal penalties or loss of benefits, which will be 
discussed in the following section, is especially concerning in light of inadequate legal 
representation for EITC claimants.  In sum, administering this anti-poverty regime 
through the tax system, despite its lower cost to the government, can come at significant 
personal expense to claimants, who are more susceptible to erroneous deprivation of their 
entitlements when compared to participants in other welfare programs.
57
  
C. A Legal Labyrinth: Navigating the EITC Audit and Appeal Processes 
Here we chronicle the unique dilemmas that confront low-income workers who 
become enmeshed in the IRS’s enforcement process.  Such workers face a cumbersome 
and often harsh bureaucracy, which they are forced to navigate, usually without 
assistance.  Failure to convince the IRS of the correctness of a tax return can result in the 
taxpayer’s being compelled to repay the EITC benefit, with interest and penalties.
58
  
Two points are crucial in considering the audit and appeals process described 
below.  First, as low-income workers, EITC claimants audited by the IRS are often not 
equipped—in terms of education, resources, or expertise—to demonstrate their 
compliance with the EITC’s complex criteria.  Second, the phenomenon described below, 
in which an EITC claimant is compelled to engage the IRS’s audit and appeals process, is 
not a rarity.  Indeed, the IRS has instituted a number of initiatives under which EITC 
claimants are more likely to be audited than middle- and upper-income taxpayers.  
Following a political firestorm over compliance in the mid-1990s, the proportion of IRS 
audits targeting EITC claimants began a dramatic increase.
59
  By 2004, an EITC 
household was 1.76 times more likely to be audited than a household with an annual 
salary over $100,000, and in 2005 a full forty-three percent of IRS audits of individual 
taxpayers involved an EITC claim.
60
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In this section, we first discuss the high error rate associated with EITC claims.  
We then examine the correspondence audits and Tax Court adjudication to which EITC 
claimants are subjected when suspected of error.  Finally, we examine the importance of 
representation during the audit process, as well as the inadequacy of current programs, 
such as the Low-Income Tax Clinic program that provides representation to low-income 
taxpayers. 
1. High Error and Audit Rate 
In the previous section’s discussion of EITC noncompliance, we detailed the high 
error rate of EITC claims and the erroneous payments that result.  Politicians have 
occasionally invoked these error rates as evidence that the EITC is broken and rife with 
fraud.
61
  In 1995, for instance, Senator William Roth proposed legislation to reduce the 
EITC, claiming that it was “probably the most abused program on the books.”
62
  
Accordingly, Congress’s efforts to deter and detect taxpayer abuse have focused 
disproportionately on EITC recipients, notwithstanding the relatively low amount per 
EITC controversy.
63
  Even though other methods for tax evasion—including corporate 
tax shelters, failure to pay corporate income taxes, and the misuse of pass-through entities 
to hide income—result in far more tax evasion than the EITC in absolute dollar terms, tax 
compliance efforts have centered so predominantly on low-income earners that by 2003 a 
taxpayer earning less than $25,000 was more likely to be audited than a taxpayer earning 
more than $100,000.
64
  EITC claimants comprise over one-third of all individual IRS 




Congress has authorized substantial funding—approximately $150 million 
annually—for auditing EITC compliance in recent years, and has enacted numerous 
enforcement measures specifically for the EITC as well.
66
  If an EITC claim is found to 
be deliberately erroneous, the IRS can block subsequent EITC claims for ten years, and 
even if negligence (rather than outright fraud) is the underlying reason, claims can 
nonetheless be blocked for two years.
67
  Furthermore, Congress has tightened the number 
of eligible children who can be claimed as qualifying dependents under the EITC, and 
has imposed particularized due diligence standards on EITC preparers.
68
  
2. IRS Audit Process 
The high prevalence of error in the EITC and the heightened enforcement efforts 
that have resulted raise concerns as to the processes that the IRS uses to detect and 
adjudicate cases of suspected error.  Unfortunately, the IRS’s elaborate audit process does 
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not appear particularly well-suited to detect instances of noncompliance.  In 2007, when 
IRS auditors denied the EITC and claimants requested reconsideration, forty-three 
percent of claimants ultimately received the EITC at an average amount of ninety-six 
percent of what they claimed on their original returns.
69
  These statistics—which suggest 
that the IRS’s initial auditing process is only slightly more accurate than a coin toss—not 
only reveal serious structural flaws in IRS auditing, but also, as we will argue in the next 
section, underscore the need for effective representation for EITC claimants who face 
potential denial of benefits.  As the National Taxpayer Advocate has argued, “[g]iven the 
significant barriers encountered by EIC taxpayers during the audit process, one must 
consider whether many audited taxpayers are truly ineligible for EI[T]C, or whether they 
were just unable to successfully navigate the IRS audit process.”
70
  
After an EITC claimant is targeted for an IRS audit, the information-gathering 
process is generally conducted on a “correspondence” basis through the mail, rather than 
in a “field,” face-to-face format.
71
  While correspondence audits are likely less 
intimidating to claimants than field audits, they pose significant disadvantages in terms of 
the ultimate outcomes—especially with respect to accuracy and fairness—of EITC 
determinations.
72
  For several important reasons, a mail-based audit system is ill suited 
for low-income taxpayers.  
First, EITC claimants are much more likely than other taxpayers to be transient 
or homeless.
73
  This creates multiple problems for correspondence audits.
74
  Because they 
change domiciles frequently (and often do not provide forwarding information to the post 
office or the IRS), transient or homeless EITC claimants are simply less likely than other 
taxpayers to receive the items that IRS auditors mail to them.
75
  Many of the working 
poor also spend intermittent periods of time in cars, motels, friends’ or relatives’ houses, 
or temporary shelters, making it very difficult for the IRS to conduct an effective 
correspondence audit of their tax returns.
76
  Considering that such audits can last for 
months, a claimant’s transience can easily disrupt an audit that is already underway, 
particularly insofar as multiple addresses complicate the document-gathering process.
77
  
For instance, the process for proving a qualifying child’s residency—which is the most 
common EITC error—requires a number of forms, such as school and medical records, 
which must have fully consistent data or a satisfactory and detailed explanation of any 
inconsistencies for the IRS to grant approval.
78
   
On a related point, the abstruse classifications used in the EITC compound the 
difficulties that claimants face when responding to document requests.  The National 
Taxpayer Advocate has consistently found that the EITC eligibility rules, especially those 
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for reporting family status for purposes of the EITC, are difficult for claimants to 
interpret correctly.
79
  Again, the qualifying child issue illustrates this complexity: a 
taxpayer’s child can be qualifying under the dependency exemption but not for the EITC, 
or vice versa.  The lack of a uniform definition of qualifying child confuses claimants 
unfamiliar with the tax system, who often understandably assume that there is no reason 




Beyond the substantive complexity of EITC rules and required documents, EITC 
claimants are often unsure which documents the IRS actually wants.  One National 
Taxpayer Advocate study found, for instance, that roughly half of taxpayers subject to a 
correspondence audit contacted the IRS by phone or in person to clarify what forms they 
needed to send in.
81
  Additionally, more than half of audited EITC claimants reported 
difficulties in obtaining the requested documents, and nearly half of the same group did 
not understand why the documents were requested in the first place.
82
  Furthermore, the 
National Taxpayer Advocate’s research shows that low-income taxpayers not only have 
inadequate access to computers, but also below-average computer literacy, thus 
complicating their ability to use the IRS’s website (on which the agency relies heavily to 
convey information to taxpayers) as an additional means for answering questions about 
their obligations with respect to a correspondence audit.
83
  
EITC claimants are also far more likely than the average taxpayer to have 
English literacy problems, whether as a result of educational disadvantages or from 
speaking English as a second language.
84
  Although there are no studies explicitly 
associating low literacy with poor EITC correspondence response rates, one could 
reasonably draw from the results of a 1990 Census report—which demonstrated that an 
individual’s literacy skills were linked to the accuracy of Census returns—in surmising 
that a similar effect likely applies to the EITC.
85
  These taxpayers face obvious 
difficulties in responding to an IRS correspondence audit.  For instance, they often lack 




Given that mail-based audits rely on a claimant’s willingness to respond (and to 
clarify points of misunderstanding before doing so), they are particularly ineffective in 
cases where taxpayers are fearful of government interaction.
87
  This problem is prevalent 
in cases involving recent immigrants, who are often concerned that by challenging the 
government over a tax controversy, they will entangle themselves in an immigration-
related matter as well.
88
  And even if these claimants were to contact the IRS in person or 
via telephone to clarify an audit question, the IRS has no budget for translators, creating 
another barrier to fair and effective audit resolution.
89
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Finally, there is a marked disparity in the burdens that an IRS audit imposes on 
low-income taxpayers when compared to their middle or upper-income counterparts.  
While the latter can often delegate the task to a lawyer or accountant, and are bothered 
only with respect to the costs associated with that assistance and any additional tax 
liability (likely to be a small percentage of their financial resources), low-income 
taxpayers must typically deal with the IRS on their own time and without professional 
expertise.
90
  These burdens can be considerable.  In 2007, for instance, more than half of 
EITC-audited taxpayers who reported submitting all of the IRS’s originally requested 
documentation also received a request for additional documentation.
91
 Likewise, more 
than half of audited claimants reported that the IRS either took over a month to 
acknowledge receipt of their documentation or provided no acknowledgment at all.  In 
her inaugural testimony to Congress in 2001 as the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina 
Olson remarked that if the IRS “subjected middle class and more affluent taxpayers to the 
kind of intrusive inquiries we routinely subject a taxpayer to in an EI[T]C audit, the entire 
EI[T]C audit program would be shut down in response to taxpayer complaints.”
92
   
No less problematic than the IRS’s audit process is the use of U.S. Tax Court to 
resolve cases in which an EITC claimant fails an audit. EITC claimants have their 
disputes referred to Tax Court as a result of the culmination of the IRS’s “deficiency 
procedure.”
93
  If, after auditing, the IRS determines that tax filers’ true tax liability 
exceeds their self-reported tax liability, they are deemed to be “deficient.”  The IRS can 
then choose to then send the taxpayer a “Notice of Deficiency.”
94
  After receiving the 
notice, taxpayers who desire a formal hearing on their claim have ninety days to seek a 
hearing before a U.S. Tax Court.
95
  
The procedure that is followed in Tax Courts closely resembles the procedures 
used in federal district court bench trials.
96
  Cases are tried before Special Trial Judges, 
using rules of procedure similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and attorneys 
from the Office of the IRS Counsel represent the government.  If the amount in dispute is 
less than $50,000 for a given tax year, as is typically the case with EITC claimants, tax 
filers are able to invoke the small case procedures that are provided for in the Tax Court’s 
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
97
  These proceedings, which are often referred to as “S” 
cases, are specifically designed to accommodate pro se representation.  To facilitate that 
goal, there are several changes to normal procedure.  Those include not requiring the 
taxpayer to file a reply brief and trials “conducted as informally as possible consistent 
with orderly procedure.”
98
  Despite the procedures that are afforded to EITC claimants in 
“S” cases, the process is still inherently adversarial.  In these adversarial proceedings, 
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While the “S Case” procedure is likely to ameliorate certain difficulties that low-
income litigants face in a formal adversarial setting, there is still a fundamental 
incongruity between the Tax Court’s use of adversarial process and the EITC’s 
predominantly low-income, pro se clientele.  As Barbara Bezdek noted in commenting on 
similarly informal adversarial processes used in Baltimore rent courts, “the rule-oriented 
court talk expected and privileged by judges in low-level courts bears little or no relation 
to people’s natural narratives.  The rules of courtroom discourse are seldom explained to 
those witnesses expected to conform to them.”
100
  Lucie White similarly notes that civil 
litigation “evoke[s] feelings of terror for many poor people,”
101
  who: 
perceive litigation as an alien or even hostile cultural setting. The talk 
and ritual of litigation constitute a discourse and a culture that are foreign 
to most poor people. Poor people obviously do not speak in the same 
dialect that lawyers, judges, and elite businesspeople use. Furthermore, 
their courtroom speech is routinely interrupted by lawyers and judges 
who use threatening tones in ordering them when not to talk and what 
not to say. Their stories are interpreted by black-robed authorities on the 




This dynamic is evident in reported Tax Court cases adjudicating EITC 
compliance, as when a Tax Court judge criticized a taxpayer who appeared to have 
difficulty speaking English with “vague and inconsistent assertions,”
103
 or when a judge 
summarily dismissed the testimony of an EITC claimant’s low-income witnesses as 
conclusory, vague, and biased by the taxpayer’s interests.
104
  In short, just as it is 
troubling to expect low-income taxpayers to navigate the complexities of the Internal 
Revenue Code without assistance, it is likewise troubling to subject them to 
correspondence-based audits and adversarial adjudication when they are suspected of 
noncompliance. 
3. Importance of Representation 
In general, legal services organizations have not assisted EITC claimants in 
navigating the legal complexities of an IRS audit—or, for that matter, in handling any 
subsequent proceeding or adjudication.
105
  This is partly because the importance of tax 
law pertaining to low-income taxpayers is a relatively recent development, driven 
predominantly by the rapid growth of the EITC over the past few decades.  Before the 
EITC, poor people had little to no interaction with the tax system, so there was no reason 
for legal services and pro bono lawyers to offer tax-related advocacy.  But now, as the 
EITC has developed into the country’s largest vehicle for delivering welfare benefits, it 
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has radically reshaped the legal challenges confronting poor Americans and created a 
need for tax representation for low-income taxpayers.  
This need has been hard to meet for several reasons.  First, tax law is widely 
perceived as a complex, isolated discipline that demands considerable specialization.
106
  
Given the resource constraints on many legal services organizations, it may be difficult to 
hire personnel with such expertise (or even to justify doing so, given that the salary could 
go toward a generalist who could handle a broader range of client matters).
107
  Also, the 
tax bar—which practices in a realm traditionally viewed as “rich people’s law”—has 




Largely because the EITC’s complexity makes it so difficult for claimants to 
manage the audit process themselves, the availability and quality of representation are 
often crucial factors in determining the outcome of an audit.  In 2004, low-income 
taxpayers with representation were twice as likely as their non-represented counterparts 
to emerge from an IRS audit with no change in their claimed EITC, at rates of 41.5% and 
23.1%, respectively.
109
  Those with representation, moreover, retained 44.8% of the 
EITC on average, as opposed to only 25.3% for unrepresented taxpayers.
110
  The type of 
representation also matters.  For instance in 2004, claimants represented by an attorney or 
CPA retained their EITC amount in full 45.8% of the time, while being disallowed their 
entire amount at a rate of 48.5%.
111
  This stands in contrast to claimants represented by 
actuaries, law and accounting students, family members, and employees of the claimant’s 
organization, who retained their full EITC entitlement in just 35.4% of cases and lost the 
entire benefit 59.1% of the time.
112
  
While these statistics show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that advocates with more 
relevant and advanced training have more success in representing EITC claimants, the 
more important question at present is whether EITC claimants are at least receiving some 
sort of representation.  This is because the vast majority of claimants (98.2%) still do not 
have any representation during an IRS audit, and, as noted above, the outcome 
differential is much greater between represented and non-represented taxpayers than it is 
among types of represented taxpayers.
113
  Additionally, the largely all-or-nothing nature 
of an EITC audit heightens the stakes of having representation: only around five percent 
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Congress has taken some steps to fill the representation gap for EITC claimants.  
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act (“RRA”) of 1998, in relevant part, established a 
$6 million program within the IRS that provided matching grants up to $100,000 to law 
and business school clinics and other 501(c)(3) organizations that provide free tax law 
assistance to low-income taxpayers.
115
  These groups, known as low-income taxpayer 
clinics (“LITCs”), can represent taxpayers in disputes with the IRS, provide outreach and 
education to taxpayers who speak English as a second language (“ESL”), or both.
116
  The 
IRS’s National Taxpayer Advocate office has administered the LITC program since 
2003.
117
  Of the 162 LITCs operating in 2009, twenty clinics dealt with ESL issues only, 
while forty-five clinics focused on IRS controversies alone and ninety-seven clinics 
offered both services.
118
  In 2008, LITC-based advocates worked for 30,648 taxpayers on 
a total of 37,391 issues, opening 10,142 cases (of which 1,804 were submitted to the U.S. 
Tax Court).
119
  LITCs are the principal option for low-income taxpayers seeking 
representation during an IRS audit; in light of the above discussion of how important 
representation is in ensuring that audit outcomes are fair and accurate, LITCs clearly play 
an essential role in the EITC framework.  
However, there are serious limitations on the efficacy of LITCs as currently 
structured and administered.  Similar to legal services organizations more broadly, LITCs 
likewise suffer from a lack of financial resources in meeting demand for their 
assistance.
120
  Compared with the amount of funding dedicated to compliance and 
enforcement of the EITC (roughly $150 million annually), the roughly $10 million 
annual outlay for LITCs is relatively small.
121
  Moreover, IRS employees who deal with 
EITC claimants cannot simply refer them to the nearest LITC for assistance, in light of 
government ethics rules prohibiting employees from recommending specific attorneys or 
accountants or from endorsing any “product, service, or enterprise.”
122
  The IRS deputy 
ethics official has interpreted these rules to mean that IRS employees can provide 
taxpayers with contact information for particular LITCs only if the taxpayer specifically 
asks, citing LITCs’ similarity to law firms insofar as they have a fiduciary responsibility 
to the taxpayer, provide legal advice, and represent taxpayers in court.
123
  The National 
Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, has disagreed with this assessment, arguing that LITCs’ 
congressional authorization, public-service orientation, and target population of low-
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III. IRS REFORMS TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF AMERICA’S WORKING 
POOR 
In Part II of this article, we explored the development of the EITC into America’s 
largest anti-poverty program and the shortcomings in the system that make it difficult for 
the working poor to both claim and protect the benefits that they are entitled to under the 
program.  Essentially, the working poor are asked to certify their own eligibility for a 
welfare benefit without any assistance.  If suspected of non-compliance, the working poor 
often must enter, without counsel, into a demanding adjudicative process with harsh, 
borderline-punitive consequences for recipients who fail to convince the IRS of their 
eligibility.  Two potential avenues toward reform may alleviate these problems.  The first 
has to do with the administration of the program itself.  It is conceivable that the IRS 
could undertake administrative reforms aimed at rendering the process of ex ante EITC 
application and ex post EITC adjudication more humane.  The second is ameliorative in 
nature and involves the legal services community.  Assuming that the IRS does not 
undertake to comprehensively reform the mechanisms for certification, delivery, and 
audit of the EITC, Congress and the legal services community can recognize the 
centrality of the EITC for millions of low-income working families, and take steps to 
make legal aid for low-income taxpayers a greater priority.  This part of the article 
addresses the former of these two options—IRS reforms aimed at rendering the EITC 
process more humane.  In turn, in Part IV we will address the latter option and advocate 
specific steps that Congress and the legal services community can take in response to the 
recognition that the EITC is among the central pillars of American welfare policy. 
Since a decision has been made to use the tax system to implement one of the 
nation’s largest welfare programs, considerations of both efficient administration and fair 
treatment would seem to counsel that significant changes be made to the current structure 
of the IRS to make the benefit easier for potential EITC claimants to both initially claim 
and subsequently protect during audits and Tax Court proceedings.  The case for such 
reforms is intuitive: even if one does not linger on the harsh consequences described in 
Part II of this article, there is simply no reason to believe that an IRS administrative 
apparatus that evolved to collect taxes from middle- and upper-income taxpayers would 
serve as a fair or efficient medium for administering a welfare program for low-income 
workers. 
Accordingly, we will examine five areas where the IRS should implement 
changes to its structure, policies, and procedures to help ease the legal burdens that IRS 
processes and procedures place on EITC claimants.  First, we will discuss the need to 
reexamine and reconsider the structure of the IRS.  Second, we will explore the 
possibility of splitting the EITC into two distinct benefits.  Third, we will analyze the 
possibility of reforming the EITC tax filing process, and the potential benefits of a 
“Ready File” system.  Fourth, we will offer reforms to modify the auditing of EITC 
claimants.  Fifth, we will present a proposal to employ less adversarial procedures for the 
Tax Court proceedings applied to EITC claimants that are deemed “deficient” following 
an audit. These reforms, if adopted either individually or in concert, would represent a 
substantial step toward helping to ease the burden that the EITC places on America’s 
working poor. 
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A. Evaluating and Reforming the Structure of the IRS 
The decision to administer the EITC through the tax system has large 
implications for the overall mission of the Internal Revenue Service.  In 2010, the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that, between 2009 and 2013, the EITC will result 
in roughly $250 billion in foregone revenue.
125
  This means that administering social 
welfare programs will come to be a more significant part of the IRS mission, and changes 
should be made to the structure and nature of the IRS to reflect that reality.  
Despite the fact that the IRS is now the agency charged with delivering 
America’s largest welfare program, the IRS’s core mission remains to collect revenue.  
Currently, the IRS collects ninety-six percent of all federal tax receipts.
126
  Moreover, the 
IRS’s primary institutional goal is addressing the “tax gap,” which is the difference 
between the amount of taxes due and the amount of taxes actually collected.
127
  This 
emphasis frustrates the goals of using the tax system for social policy in two ways.  First, 
the most reliable current estimate of the magnitude of the annual gross underreporting 
gap comes from 2001, when it was calculated at $345 billion.
128
  Of this total, $285 
billion was from incorrect reporting on tax returns (as opposed to failure to file or 
pay).
129
  The individual income underreporting gap was approximately $197 billion of 
the $285 billion total.
130
  In contrast, the amount of incorrectly claimed credits, including 
the EITC, was only $17 billion.
131
  This means that incorrectly claimed credits account 
for less than five percent of the total tax credits, which is a relatively minor fraction of the 
total.
132
  Second, the emphasis on closing the tax gap also motivates the IRS to attempt to 
crack down on non-compliance instead of promoting participation in programs.  These 
two goals are often in conflict with each other, and the mission and culture of the IRS 
often leads to the collection and compliance activities of the IRS overshadowing the 
social policy objectives of programs such as the EITC. 
As a result, the IRS should reevaluate its mission statement to acknowledge its 
dual roles of promoting tax compliance and delivering social programs.  New Zealand is 
an illustrative example of how this can occur, as highlighted by the U.S. National 
Taxpayer Advocate.
133
  In 2004, New Zealand passed a comprehensive social welfare 
program aimed at combining support to families with incentives to work that is 
administered through the country’s tax system, Inland Revenue.
134
  This reform “had 
three key objectives: making work pay, ensuring income adequacy, and supporting 
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people . . . into paid work.”
135
  Since this changed the mission of Inland Revenue to 
create a greater emphasis on delivering benefits, instead of promoting compliance, a 
comprehensive “analytical redesign process” was undertaken.
136
  This process helped to 
change the culture, structure, and emphasis of the agency to recognize the new dual 
mission.  Although the reforms have only been in place a few years, initial econometric 
research has suggested that New Zealand’s reforms have resulted in increases in 
employment and hours worked due to the tax reforms.
137
  
In America, despite the fact that the EITC has existed since the mid-1970s and 
been a major part of our welfare system since mid-1990s, the IRS has yet to undergo a 
reform process that recognizes the importance of the social programs that Congress has 
chosen to deliver through the tax system.
138
  Given the importance of the EITC to 
American welfare policy, this is a necessary step that should be considered to transform 
the IRS from an organization predominantly concerned with enforcement to an agency 
with the separate roles of revenue collection and social policy administration.  Although 
these reforms may dramatically transform the IRS, the Federal Reserve can provide an 
example of an institution that has successfully adopted two theoretically conflicting 
missions.
139
  Under the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, it is the dual mission of the 
Federal Reserve to promote production and employment while curbing inflation.
140
  
Although the Federal Reserve’s dual role has come under attack recently by members of 
Congress who feel that the focus should be solely on keeping inflation low,
141
 these 
criticisms appear to highlight the fact that the Federal Reserve has internalized the 
importance of both parts of its mission.
142
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If the IRS were to recognize the importance of delivering social programs—
specifically the EITC—to its mission, it could undertake a variety of experiments to 
address the myriad incongruities that, as Part II makes clear, currently bedevil the 
program’s administration.
143
  The ultimate success or failure of the specific reforms 
discussed in sub-parts B-E may ultimately be reliant on thoroughgoing structural reforms 
that vest responsibility for EITC in an administrative structure focused on social policy. 
B. Changing the Eligibility Structure of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
In addition to reevaluating the mission of the IRS, the structure of the EITC 
should also be altered to allow for greater participation in the program.  Currently, 
eligibility for the EITC reflects two basic considerations: income and family structure.
144
  
The result is that individuals hoping to apply for a refundable tax credit due to their low 
income must also provide information on how many months of the year they have 
custody over children, or other complicated information about their overall eligibility.  
This causes several distinct problems.
145
  First, this requirement makes the application 
more burdensome and deters many applicants who are intimidated by the process.  
Second, the verification process is more difficult because confirming eligibility for the 
EITC requires examining income and family structure, which are two separate inquiries.  
Third, requiring applicants to provide information on both issues increases the likelihood 
that they will make a mistake, and thus increases the frequency of audits and denied 
claims.  
To address these problems, the EITC could be broken into two separate tax 
credits: a “Worker Credit” and a “Family Credit.”  This approach has been advocated by 
the National Taxpayer Advocate in its 2005 and 2008 annual reports to Congress,
146
 and 
was reiterated by the National Taxpayer Advocate in testimony to the Senate in 2011.
147
  
This approach was also endorsed by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform in 2005.
148
  The United Kingdom has split its equivalent of the EITC into two 




The National Taxpayer Advocate has argued that such a divided credit would 
entail a number of advantages.  First, breaking the EITC into two separate credits would 
simplify the process by which the working poor apply for tax benefits.  As previously 
noted, potential claimants are required to provide information on both their income and 
family status.  If the process is reformed so that potential applicants are able to claim a 
“Worker Credit” without also being forced to apply for the “Family Credit,” many 
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additional eligible workers may apply each year.  This is because potential claimants 
often have confusing family structures and relationships, and are unsure how to document 
them on their tax return.  On the other hand, workers often know much more precisely 
whether their earned income would meet the requirements of a “Worker Credit.”  As a 
result, the reformed self-certification process would not scare off potential applicants by 
reframing their eligibility for the overall credit into two separate inquiries.  Additionally, 
dividing the credit into two payments would have the benefit of lowering incentives to 
cheat or provide misinformation on the application, because applicants will be more 
aware of the fact that they can still be eligible for part of the benefit without meeting 
other eligibility requirements.   
Second, a divided benefit would help improve the verification process for 
claimants’ eligibility.  Assessing income eligibility for the program is undertaken in part 
through electronic verification of income data submitted on applicants’ W-2 forms.  This 
electronic checking is identical to the verification that is done for individuals claiming a 
standard deduction who do not also claim the EITC.  The more difficult eligibility 
verification, however, is determining family status.  For example, to claim a qualifying 
child, a claimant must meet four tests: (1) a relationship test, (2) a residency test, (3) an 
age test, and (4) a support test.
150
  Verifying any of these tests requires the IRS to collect 
additional data.  The IRS, as a result, has great difficulty assessing these elements of 
eligibility for the credit (such as whether a child lived with the claimant or with another 
parent).  Separating the EITC into two separate credits would disentangle the simple task 
of verifying eligibility based on income from the complex task of verifying eligibility 
based on family structure.  
Finally, creating two separate credits in place of the EITC would also streamline 
the auditing process.  During the auditing process, individuals are asked to provide 
information on various aspects of their eligibility for the credit.
151
  If, however, the IRS 
only has questions on one of the credits being claimed, the audit would be less 
intimidating and require less information.  This has the advantage of both decreasing the 
total number of audits that need to be performed, and also increasing the number of 
eligible applicants that are able to keep their refund despite being audited.  This is critical 
given the EITC audit process’s daunting requirements and alarmingly high error rate, 
which causes a significant number of taxpayers to lose their benefits during the auditing 
process simply because they have difficulty complying with the audit’s requirements.
152
  
If there were fewer audits needed to administer two separate tax credits, and the audits 
that were to occur required less information, it is likely that fewer qualifying low-income 
families would lose the benefit of this program.  
C. Changing the Application for the Earned Income Tax Credit 
One of the primary reasons that the EITC has higher participation rates than other 
social welfare benefits is that most adult Americans file tax returns.
153
  Given this reality, 
the burden of claiming the EITC is minimal compared with the burden of filing a separate 
application that is required for most other welfare benefits.
154
  Additionally, the 
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perceived burden is lower due to the EITC’s self-certification process, under which 
potential claimants only have to interact with the government directly if they are subject 
to an audit.  That said, despite the fact that most adults do file tax returns, it is estimated 
that in 2009 forty-seven percent of all individual taxpayers do not have an obligation to 
file tax returns because they have either a zero or negative tax liability.
155
  As a result, by 
choosing to administer this welfare benefit for low-income workers through the tax 
system, the government is imposing the potentially significant burden on many EITC 
claimants of filing a tax return that they would otherwise not be required to file.  Given 
that this is often a burden for EITC tax filers, the IRS should take steps to simplify the tax 
return that individuals with no tax obligation are required to complete. 
As part of that goal, the IRS should take steps to develop a “Ready Return” 
modeled on the program that was developed in California in 2005.
156
  A “Ready Return” 
program recognizes the reality that there is usually little need for a taxpayer to fill out 
information on her income or to complete complicated math.  Income data from W-2 
forms are submitted to the IRS by employers who withhold their employees’ taxes.  
Currently, when a tax filer completes a tax return, the IRS checks the information 
provided by the filer against the information provided by the employer.
157
  This system, 
however, can be beneficially inverted.  Instead of asking tax filers to submit the 
information for the IRS to double check, “Ready Return” programs present tax filers with 
pre-populated forms that contain their individual income information that are submitted 
by their employers.  Tax filers then simply confirm that the information submitted by 
their employers is accurate and comprehensive.
158
  
In California, the “Ready Return” is only available to individuals filing very 
simple tax returns who do not claim many deductions or sources of interest income.
159
  
Although this may prevent the “Ready Return” from serving as an overall fix for the tax 
return system, it should not prevent the development of a similar system to serve EITC 
claimants, who typically do not have complicated sources of income.
160
  As a result, the 
IRS should be capable of developing a program where low-income tax filers can update 
their EITC applications each year by simply confirming the information that the 
government has on their income, living, and family situations.  This reform would reduce 
the burden of self-certification, and, by lowering the EITC’s error rate, reduce 
administrative costs spent on audits.  It would also help supplement the IRS’s ongoing 
efforts to promote free tax preparation assistance to low-income taxpayers through the 
VITA volunteer program, as discussed in Part II. 
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D. Reforming the Audit Process Used with Earned Income Tax Credit 
Claimants 
Restructuring the way that the IRS conducts audits of tax returns where the EITC 
is claimed would help to make the EITC fairer.
161
  As previously discussed, after an 
EITC claimant is targeted for an IRS audit, the audit is typically conducted on a 
correspondence basis; moreover, EITC claimants are both more likely to be audited than 
high-income taxpayers, and more likely to have difficulties with the auditing process.
162
  
The IRS should thus enhance the audit process of EITC claims by lowering hurdles that 




First, steps should be taken to improve the communication between the IRS and 
the EITC claimant during the auditing process.  An EITC correspondence audit typically 
starts with a letter informing an EITC claimant that he or she is being audited.  In 2007, 
the National Taxpayer Advocate Service conducted a comprehensive survey of 754 
different taxpayers who had been audited because of issues surrounding their 2004 tax 
year EITC claims.
164
  In the survey, less than a third of the respondents felt that the initial 
notification letter that they had received was easy to understand, and only half felt that, 
after reviewing the letter, they knew what they were expected to do.
165
  Given their 
confusion, over ninety percent of the respondents contacted the IRS about their audits to 
try to gain more information.
166
  This illustrates that most EITC claimants are left 
overwhelmed and confused by the IRS’s current communication process.  
There are also several ways to clarify the means of correspondence.  To make the 
standard form letter easier to understand, National Taxpayer Service studies could help 
determine what wording, structure, and information ought to be included in the letter.
167
  
The initial notification letter, and all subsequent communications, should also include the 
name of a single case officer who can be contacted with any questions that audited parties 
might have after receiving written communications that they find confusing.  The case 
officer should, whenever possible, also take the affirmative step of phoning the claimant 
after a notification letter has been mailed.  Finally, every notification letter and 
communication ought to include information on the benefits of obtaining representation 
during the auditing process.  
Additionally, the current regulation forbidding the IRS from proactively referring 
taxpayers to LITCs
168
 should be abolished, and case officers should be empowered to 
provide contact information for any nearby LITCs so that audited parties are aware of the 
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assistance that is available.
169
  Similarly, once an audited claimant has retained the 
services of an LITC, the LITC officials should not be barred from communicating with 
the claimant about his or her current tax year issues, as is now the case.  In addressing 
past year controversies, LITC officers are frequently undoing errors committed by third-
party tax preparers.
170
  Perversely, then, this rule encourages a situation where, after the 
LITC solves the past year’s problem, claimants often return to their familiar tax preparers 
and undergo the same type of audit the following year.  
In addition to improving communication during the auditing process, measures 
should also be adopted to clarify the documentation required to resolve the audit.  The 
National Taxpayer Advocate’s survey indicates that fifty-nine percent of the respondents 
identified difficulty obtaining the necessary documentation, and only fifty-five percent of 
respondents indicated that they even understood “how the documents would answer the 
IRS’s questions about the EITC claim.”
171
  For example, EITC claimants are often asked 
to provide documentation that their child was enrolled in a local school to prove that their 
child meets the residency requirement for a qualifying child under EITC’s guidelines.  
Frequently, EITC respondents then submit documentation proving that their child was in 
school for the previous school year, forgetting that to prove this fact for the previous tax 
year, they need to provide documentation that their child was enrolled in both the spring 
and fall semesters (spanning two school years).
172
  As a result, the initial notification 
letter should be modified to provide a simple and explicit checklist of the documentation 
that is required for the audit.  The listed documentation should give specific, concrete 
examples of all documentations required to complete the correspondence audit.  
Even if the audited EITC claimants understand what is being requested, they 
often have difficulty obtaining the proper documentation.  In 2004, the IRS piloted the 
use of affidavits from reliable third parties when an EITC claimant was unable to find 
appropriate documentation for the child residency requirement.
173
  Under this pilot 
program, if an EITC claimant was audited and unable to find appropriate documentation 
for that requirement, he or she could submit a form completed by a school administrator, 
social worker from another agency, clergy member, or other reliable third party.  The IRS 
agent conducting the audit was then able to follow up with the third party and quickly 
confirm information about the claimant’s family status and living situation.  Although 
this system is certainly prone to error, and there is the possibility that the affidavit could 
be fabricated, the National Taxpayer Advocate Service’s 2009 Annual Report to 
Congress indicated that “the affidavit is the most effective and accurate means of proving 
eligibility and the taxpayers prefer the affidavit to providing documents, records, or 
letters.”
174
  Given that the pilot program appears to have been a success, the IRS’s 2004 
                                                     
169 It should be noted that the IRS is currently barred from referring taxpayers to LITCs by law.  
The Taxpayer Assistance Act of 2010 is currently before the House Ways and Means Committee, and among 
other changes, would allow the IRS to begin referring taxpayers to LITCs.  See generally Congress 
Introduces Bill to Help Taxpayers Cope with IRS, ACCOUNTING TODAY FOR THE WEB CPA (Apr. 13, 2010) 
(discussing the Taxpayer Assistance Act of 2010, which will allow IRS employees to refer taxpayers to 
LITCs), http://www.webcpa.com/news/Congress-Introduces-Bill-Help-Taxpayers-Cope-IRS-53885-1.html.  
170 Email from Tamara Borland, Dir., Iowa Legal Aid’s Low Income Tax Clinic, to Joshua Boehm 
(Aug. 8, 2011, 18:51 CST) (on file with authors).  
171 See Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 106. 
172 Id. at 97.  
173 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., REP. ON FISCAL YEAR 2005 TESTS, at iii (2007). 
174 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 35, at 97-98.  
202 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:177 
pilot program should be expanded and adopted as the norm during correspondence audits 
of EITC claimants.  
Third, the IRS should take steps to reform the audit process so that EITC 
claimants are not under the impression that they are subject to the correspondence audit 
process alone.  In the National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2007 survey, over seventy percent 
of respondents would have preferred a system other than correspondence to resolve their 
audit,
175
 despite the fact that those audited have a right to request that they instead be 
subject to a “face to face” audit instead of simply being subject to the correspondence 
process.
176
  This right is difficult for those audited to assert, however, because they are 
not typically notified of this right in initial communications and do not know how to 
assert the right.  As a result, the initial notification letter should also be modified so that it 
informs audited tax filers about their right to a “face to face” audit, and includes a 
checklist of the steps that must be taken to assert that right.
177
  This reform, along with 
the others suggested, may increase the overall costs of the auditing process.  But since a 
decision has been made to use the tax system to administer one of the primary social 
welfare programs for the working poor, these rights should not be denied simply because 
individuals are unable to understand what is being asked of them in the process, what 
documentation is required to resolve the audit, and what rights they have during the audit.  
This is especially critical given the National Taxpayer Advocate’s admission that a “lack 
of representation during an audit puts EITC taxpayers at an inherent disadvantage over 
those taxpayers who are represented.”
178
 
E. Moving Toward A Non-Adversarial Alternative To Tax Court 
Given the above discussion of the difficulties low-income taxpayers encounter in 
engaging the Tax Court’s adversarial adjudicative processes, a system that would be both 
more normatively fair and produce less incongruous results should be adopted.
179
  An 
excellent model exists in another welfare context: Social Security Disability Insurance 
(“SSDI”) adjudication.  SSDI proceedings, which are “inquisitorial” rather than 
“adversarial” in nature, are distinct in a number of ways that may prove beneficial if 
transposed to the EITC context.  First, the SSDI adjudication is presided over by an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
180
  The ALJ plays the roles of advocate for the 
government, advocate for unrepresented defendants, and adjudicator who makes a 
decision in the case.
181
  Second, the cases are far less formal. They are typically 
conducted in a small conference room with only the ALJ, the defendant, and 
representatives or witnesses for the defendant present.
182
  As a result, the proceedings are 
                                                     
175 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 70, at 95. 
176 See id. at 116.   
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178 Id. at 97.  
179 See generally Jonathan P. Schneller, The Administration of Tax Expenditures: The Case of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the adversarial procedures of 
the U.S. Tax Court are ill-suited to EITC controversies, due to claimants’ resource constraints, and 
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180 RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 598 (5th ed. 2006).  
181 See Fred Davis & James Reynolds, Profile of a Social Security Disability Case, 42 MO. L. REV. 
541, 549-50 (1977); see also Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue 
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182 See CASS, DIVER & BEERMANN, supra note 180, at 598.  
2012] THE EITC, LOW-INCOME WORKERS, & THE LEGAL AID COMMUNITY 203 




Moving to a model similar to the one used in SSDI adjudications for EITC 
claimants who are deemed “delinquent” after IRS audits would have several distinct 
advantages.  First, it would help to alleviate the inequities that are suffered because EITC 
claimants have limited access to counsel for the Tax Court proceedings.  Moreover, it 
would help to ensure that in at least one stage in the process, there is a government 
advocate helping EITC claimants to present their side of the story.  It would also create 
potential efficiencies because the proceedings would require a single government 
employee, instead of the judges, attorneys, and court staff who are currently used for “S” 
cases in Tax Court.  And finally, the SSDI approach would allow for a flexible 
adjudicative inquiry in which ALJs could have follow-up meetings and take it upon 
themselves to consult with social workers, school officials, or clergy members who 
understand the circumstances of the EITC claimant.  To be sure, ensuring the neutrality 
of the ALJ proceedings will also depend greatly on how burdens of proof are allocated; 
careful consideration must be given to what testimony and facts the ALJ must elicit 
before denying benefits.
184
  Properly designed, the features of an ALJ system are far 
better suited to the needs and capabilities of low-income litigants, and their application in 
the EITC context should be considered accordingly. 
IV. THE NEED FOR INCREASED INVOLVEMENT FROM CONGRESS AND 
THE LEGAL AID COMMUNITY 
While the IRS-centered reforms proposed in the previous section have varying 
levels of political feasibility, the legal aid community may be better placed to enact 
timely and meaningful changes that benefit EITC claimants, given its core mission to 
assist the poorest Americans.  To that end, this part discusses discrete initiatives available 
to the legal aid community that can address current pathologies in the EITC.  As will be 
discussed below, the legal aid community is already achieving substantial gains in 
promoting awareness and developing easier methods for potential EITC claimants to file 
federal tax returns.  Yet it must still take additional steps to offer representation during 
the auditing process and Tax Court proceedings, where, as noted above, there remains a 
great unmet need for legal assistance.  
To be sure, legal aid organizations are in the midst of an extraordinarily difficult 
fiscal situation,
185
 and are already forced to turn away as many clients as they are able to 
help.
186
 Congress has greatly erred in its decision to cut Legal Services Corporation 
(“LSC”) funding from $420 million in 2010 to $348 million in 2012.  As LSC President 
James Sandman has pointed out, this sharp reduction in resources comes at “a time when 
low-income families are increasingly seeking legal assistance” in matters implicating 
fundamental needs, including “domestic violence, foreclosure, veterans’ benefits, and 
                                                     
183 See Book, supra note 4, at 401-02.  
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185 See Staff Reductions Hit Legal Aid Programs, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/staff-reductions-hit-legal-aid-programs (noting that 13.3% of 
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204 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:177 
other matters.”
187
  While Congress surely faces tough budgetary choices of its own, we 
question the wisdom, cost-effectiveness, and morality of weakening such a critical part of 
the social safety net—precisely when the poorest Americans need it most—to garner 
savings representing a tiny fraction of the federal budget.   
Accordingly, we understand that the observations and recommendations we make 
in this section may be difficult to effectuate at this particular time.  But, even in a tight 
budgetary context, the importance and scale of the EITC representation shortfall should 
nonetheless command a greater amount of attention from Congress and the legal aid 
community.  In this section, we explore four steps that the legal aid community can take 
to meet the needs of EITC claimants.  First, we examine limited assistance programs that 
are currently available to EITC claimants.  In this discussion, we address the advances 
that have been made in the last decade, as well as potential steps that can be taken to 
improve self-help resources for EITC claimants.  Second, we explore the failure of the 
modern civil Gideon movement to include representation in tax proceedings.  Third, we 
analyze the need to increase the resources and enhance the services of LITCs.  We 
conclude by arguing that Congress should appropriate new budgetary funds to the LSC 
for assisting in tax cases, notwithstanding austerity pressures, and that LSC grantees 
should consider ways to reallocate existing resources to tax cases as soon as practicable.  
The dual recognitions that (1) the EITC has largely displaced traditional welfare in 
American anti-poverty policy; and (2) the EITC imposes legal burdens arguably more 
daunting than those associated with traditional welfare, compel a renewed focus on the 
program by Congress and the legal aid community.  
A. Limited Assistance Programs and the EITC 
One innovative solution for meeting the needs of potential EITC tax filers is the 
adoption of limited assistance programs.
188
  Limited assistance programs are efforts to 
provide self-represented litigants with the necessary information and resources to be able 
to effectively resolve their legal disputes without an attorney or other trained 
professional.
189
  Examples of limited assistance programs include offering simplified 
forms, providing pamphlets in a wide range of languages, establishing hotlines with legal 
information, or even selling “unbundled” legal services.
190
  
These programs have been increasingly used to fill a wide range of needs across 
the legal services landscape, and offer several potential benefits over more labor-
intensive options.  First, limited assistance programs free up the time of legal aid lawyers 
and pro-bono attorneys to work on cases that require high levels of professional 
training.
191
  Second, limited assistance programs can have impressive returns to scale 
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because the variable costs are low relative to the fixed costs of initially starting the 
programs.
192
  Third, the programs may gain political support more easily due to their 
emphasis on individualism.  Fourth, commentators hypothesize that, by playing a larger 
role in making their own case, clients learn lessons that they are able to use in the future 
both to avoid conflicts and to help resolve them with less assistance.
193
  As a result of 
these benefits, LSC data currently suggest that three-fourths of all completed legal aid 
matters involve “advice, referral, or limited assistance.”
194
  Although the EITC’s 
complexities often create a need for representation and assistance, limited assistance 
programs can still play a pivotal role in ameliorating the EITC’s administrative 
shortcomings.  
One of the most prominent examples of a limited assistance program designed to 
help EITC claimants is the Legal Aid Society of Orange County’s (“LASOC”) 
development of its “EIC Partner” website (www.eicpartner.com).
195
  The EIC Partner 
website promotes the use of free internet filing software that helps potential claimants file 
for the EITC.  In the 2007 tax year, this service helped over 25,000 individual tax filers, 
and resulted in nearly $12 million in EITC benefits being paid out.
196
  These usage rates 
continue to improve, and as a result, the LSC recently reported that tax filers from 49 
states used the I-CAN! software and were able to claim $110 million in total refunds.
197
  
This website and its associated organization serve three key functions.   
First, the EIC Partner website provides information for potential EITC filers on 
how to use I-CAN!.  This software provides online forms and information that allow 
users from anywhere in the country to file for the EITC while completing their federal tax 
returns.
198
  Since the software is free and contains detailed information on common 
problems confronting low-income taxpayers, it is, for many EITC claimants, a preferable 
alternative to fee-based preparation software or professional help.  Although the I-CAN! 
software was once only available without charge to EITC-eligible individuals, it is now 
available to any tax filer, unless the filer also owns a small business or is subject to a few 
minor exceptions.
199
  The software is also able to e-file state tax returns for residents of 
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CORPORATION (March 1, 2011), available at http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/i-can-e-file-hits-new-
high-tax-refunds-low-income-americans (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).  
198 See Charn, supra note 188, at 1040.  
199 Id.; see also Legal Aid Society of Orange County, I-CAN! E-File, I-CAN! E-FILE,  
http://www.icanefile.org/index.asp?caller= (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (“You can generally use I-Can! E-File 
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California, Montana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York.
200
  In the 2007 and 2008 
tax years, EIC Partner conducted an online survey that users were asked to complete after 
using the program to complete their tax returns.  In that survey, fifty-nine percent of 
respondents indicated that the software was “very easy to use” and fifty-eight percent of 
respondents indicated that they were “very satisfied” overall with the I-CAN Software.
201
  
The survey data did indicate one of the limitations of the service: seventy-two percent of 
respondents indicated that they used the internet daily, and another fifteen percent of 
respondents indicated that they used the internet weekly.
202
  As a result, although this 
service is quite valuable to many low-income tax filers, its scalability is effectively 
restricted to the subset of filers with computer proficiency, access, or both.  Although this 
does not undermine the potential benefits of the service, it does indicate a limitation in 
meeting the needs of all EITC tax filers.  
Second, in addition to the EIC Partner website, the LASOC runs a hotline that 
potential EITC claimants can call for information.  The hotline is a toll-free number that 
greets callers with an automated message on the EITC, information explaining how to 
apply, and information regarding access to the I-CAN! software.
203
  At the end of the 
automated message, callers are prompted to enter their five-digit zip code.  After doing 
so, the callers are notified of free tax service centers in their area.
204
  As part of this 
service, the LASOC actively encourages any organization that is able or willing to 
provide advice on the EITC to register with the hotline so that its contact information is 
listed after a caller enters a zip code in its area.
205
  In 2008, over 4,400 individuals took 
advantage of the hotline.
206
  
Third, the EIC Partner website provides resources for partner organizations 
seeking to assist EITC claimants.  To this end, EIC Partner develops best practices that it 
disseminates to organizations that wish to help potential EITC filers claim the benefit.
207
  
Additionally, partner organizations are given a unique URL to put on their webpage.  
Any time the URL is used for a filer to access the I-CAN! filing software, the 
organization that directed the tax filer there is given information for tracking its success 
in helping individuals claim the EITC.
208
  An excellent example of a partnering 
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organization is the Montana Legal Services Association,
209
 which has created a website 
based on the EIC Partner’s information and software (www.montanafreefile.org).  By the 
2008 tax season, Montana Free File helped refund over $3.25 million to I-CAN! E-File 
users in the state of Montana.
210
  Of that total, sixty-one percent was from the EITC.
211
  
This illustrates the success that legal services organizations can have in helping 
individuals access social benefits that they are due through the tax system.  
All three of these activities demonstrate how limited assistance programs can be 
developed to help potential EITC claimants obtain the welfare benefits that they are 
entitled to without resorting to expensive private tax preparers.  The success of I-CAN! 
shows that more resources and effort should be devoted to developing and spreading 
awareness of the EITC assistance that the program makes available.  
Although the LASOC’s development of the EIC Partner program and I-CAN! 
software is a laudable example of “a culture of bottom-up creativity and innovation” in 
the development of legal services,
212
 there are still limits to the organization’s ability to 
provide legal services to EITC claimants.  LASOC’s technical assistance is restricted to 
questions that users have on how to use the I-CAN! software, how to check their E-File 
status, how to enter tax information into the software, and how to amend a rejected 
return.
213
  All other inquiries about one’s tax situation are directed to the IRS.
214
  
Accordingly, the organization’s assistance operates exclusively at the filing stage of an 
EITC claim, and does not extend to EITC claimants who are having their tax returns 
audited.
215
  Since, as previously noted, EITC claimants are far more likely to be audited 
than ordinary taxpayers and benefit dramatically from representation,
216
 this is a critical 
gap in the information and services provided by the “EIC Partner” organization.  
As a result, funds should be allocated to help develop information for those EITC 
filers who are subjected to an audit.  First, the EIC hotline should be expanded (or a new 
hotline created) so that EITC claimants subject to an audit can gain access to information 
on the audit process and the location of the nearest legal aid resource.  Second, the 
website should provide clear information on the audit and Tax Court process.  For 
example, the site could provide examples of the types of documents to submit during 
correspondence audits to satisfy common IRS requests.  Similarly, the EIC Partner 
organization could begin development of audit best practices to complement the filing 
best practices currently provided to partner organizations.  Although not an exhaustive 
list, all of these steps would be relatively straightforward mechanisms to improve the 
coverage of taxpayer self-help and extend the limited assistance made possible by the 
EIC Partner website into the domain of EITC audits and Tax Court adjudication.  
As helpful as such programs can be, they are necessarily limited to individuals 
with the literacy and initiative to attain self-help via navigation of such resources.  As one 
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commentator pointed out when discussing the limits of self-help in the tax system, 
“[s]lightly more than 20% of the population lacks the skills necessary to read a food 
label, fill out a form, or read a simple story to a child.”
217
  A single mother with full-time 
work and child-rearing responsibilities but lacking Internet access may not be well-
positioned to avail herself of limited assistance resources such as the I-CAN! program.  
The IRS’s VITA program, as discussed earlier, is well-placed to remedy this gap.
218
  
VITA’s trained volunteers not only serve a critical role in areas where programs such as 
EIC Partner and I-CAN! are not yet implemented, but can also assist where EITC 
claimants have access to such technology but are unable or unwilling to use it.  Many 
legal services organizations recognize the importance of VITA in meeting this demand 
and make concerted efforts to publicize VITA site locations to their clientele; it is critical 
that they continue to do so.
219
  
B. Expanding and Improving Low Income Tax Clinics 
Low Income Tax Clinics (“LITCs”) can and must play a much greater role with 
respect to representing EITC claimants who have been targeted for audits.
220
  Viewed in 
light of the significant need for and dramatic impact of representation, the federal LITC 
budget of $9.5 million per year is woefully inadequate,
221
 both when seen in light of need 
for legal services and in light of the estimated $300 million a year that eligible EITC 
claimants are denied due to the lack of representation.
222
  LITCs handled roughly 37,000 
taxpayer controversies in 2008; assuming an LITC funding amount of $20 million (a 
figure which assumes the full budget was disbursed along with matching spending by 
educational institutions), the average cost per controversy can be estimated at $540.
223
  
While it is unrealistic, at least in the immediate term, to expect Congress to expand the 
LITC program budget in order to provide representation to every claimant, each 
additional audit representation will, on average, diminish the amount of erroneous 
deprivation ($623) by more than the cost of that representation ($540).  Additional 
expenditures on audit representation will not necessarily pay for themselves; in fact, if 
such representation is effective, it will actually cost the government more because 
claimants will be recouping a greater percentage of their EITC entitlements.  Rather, this 
comparison illustrates that dedicating more funding to EITC representation would be a 
cost-effective use of administrative resources.  Moreover, LITC funding might reduce the 
cost of the IRS audit process, because represented and advised parties can be expected to 
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focus more on salient issues, provide necessary documentation in response to initial IRS 
requests, and handle hearings in an efficient manner.
224
 
Furthermore, the cost of representation must be viewed in the broader context of 
the policy choices Congress made in enacting the EITC.  By putting essentially no 
resources into pre-certification, unlike other welfare programs such as TANF, Congress 
effectively opted for low administrative costs at the expense of error rates, while shifting 
the costs of compliance from the state to the low-income taxpayer.
225
  While Congress 
has devoted significant resources to EITC compliance and enforcement (roughly $150 
million annually), when viewed against a backdrop of $10 billion in EITC disbursals to 
non-qualifying recipients for the 1999 tax year,
226
 it seems incongruous that only $10 
million has been dedicated to help ensure that qualified audited recipients retain their full 
benefits by providing representation.  
C. Deepening Legal Aid Programs’ Involvement with Tax Matters 
The LSC and its local grantees should consider recognizing the EITC’s 
pervasiveness and undertaking initiatives to assist EITC claimants.  The LSC’s latitude to 
assist EITC claimants is somewhat restricted by its guidelines, which limit eligibility for 
LSC assistance to individuals with incomes equivalent to 125% of the federal poverty 
guidelines.
227
  However, a significant number of EITC recipients fall within the LSC’s 




There are two paths for the LSC and grantee organizations to deepen their 
support for EITC recipients.  First, current LSC grantees could expand the range of 
resources they devote to EITC assistance.  To illustrate, recent data suggest that two of 
the largest legal aid programs in the country, in New York and Los Angeles, dedicate 
around one-fifth of their hours toward government benefits retention cases.
229
  These 
include cases where individuals have been deprived of benefits under Social Security, 
food stamps, TANF, Supplemental Security Income, and other federal and state-specific 
welfare programs.
230
  These are undoubtedly important issues, and tax problems of EITC 
claimants are just one of the many legal problems that low-income individuals face each 
year.  After all, there are an estimated “45 million to 75 million low- and moderate-
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income people who have legal problems for which interested and competent lawyers 
might be a benefit.”
231
   
Yet it remains critical to recognize the importance of the “hidden” welfare state 
in contemporary anti-poverty policies.  Consider, for instance, that the government 
benefits litigation budget for New York City’s Legal Services NYC ($8.9 million in 
2009-10) is not significantly less than the entire federal outlay for EITC representation 
($9 million as matching funds for LITCs).
232
  Given that LITCs can currently represent 
so few audited EITC claimants—less than two percent, as noted above—legal aid groups 
might consider allocating some portion of their government benefits litigation funding to 
help close this yawning representation gap.  While again acknowledging that the 
feasibility and impact of any such shift would likely be modest at present, given stark 
budget cutbacks at LSC grantees, it is nonetheless important to highlight the severe 
underrepresentation of EITC claimants (even in relation to other underserved clients).   
As we suggested earlier, lawmakers ought to recognize that even in times of 
fiscal austerity, providing legal help to the poorest Americans facing EITC challenges—
involving benefits that finance basic needs—should remain a high budgetary priority.  A 
more promising path, accordingly, would be for Congress to allocate new funding to the 
LSC and local legal aid societies for assistance of EITC claimants.  While LSC grantees 
choose their own priorities, the LSC could seek a special competitive grant to assist EITC 
claimants with filing.  Such funding could enable legal aid societies to serve as a 
backstop to the automated and self-help measures that they are currently funding and 
spearheading.  There are clear opportunities for legal aid societies to expand and integrate 
their self-help and limited-assistance tax initiatives, like I-CAN!, with their core 
competencies in providing direct legal advice.  Frequently, LSC grantees encounter 
clients who are simultaneously trying to resolve prior year controversies while also 
completing returns for the current year.
233
  At present, there is a strict division of funding 
and responsibilities between legal aid organizations and VITA programs, which 
complicates the resolution of such cases: legal aid attorneys must deal only with the past 
year problems while referring the client to a VITA site to complete the current year’s 
taxes.
234
  To increase efficiency and reduce the risk of error and miscommunication, legal 
aid attorneys should have the resources and mandate to deal with all of the client’s tax 
issues in such circumstances. 
To be sure, any Congressional funding increase for pre-filing EITC assistance at 
legal aid societies would likely engender political criticism because such reform imbues 
the EITC with greater administrative costs, thus reducing its supposed advantage over 
other welfare programs like TANF and food stamps.  Ultimately, though, such funding 
would likely generate sufficient benefits to outweigh those costs.  Deeper legal aid 
involvement with complicated pre-filing EITC cases could augment the salutary effect of 
I-CAN!, VITA, and self-help by further cutting into the billions of dollars that EITC 
claimants spend annually on private tax preparation assistance.
235
  If EITC claimants 
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knew that government-funded advice were available, they would presumably be less 
inclined to seek assistance from private preparers with high rates of non-compliance.  
Thus, it could be expected that legal aid involvement in pre-tax filing would both ensure 
that claimants retain a greater portion of the credit to which they are entitled, and reduce 
erroneous filings encouraged by unscrupulous private preparers. 
LSC competitive grants could also be targeted at representation in the audit and 
Tax Court settings.  As noted, some LITCs are already run by legal aid groups—as of 
2011, roughly one in five were
236
—such close coordination between general legal 
services and low-income tax representation is laudable and should be encouraged.  And 
certain state legal aid groups, such as Legal Services of New Jersey, already provide 
some tax services in-house.
237
  However, the involvement of legal aid groups in poverty-
level tax work is generally very low and must be expanded.
238
  One potential barrier may 
be, as Book suggests, that “lawyers tend to view tax law as an isolated discipline, 
requiring great specialization due to the area’s complexity, both substantively and 
procedurally.”
239
  But as statistics show, the problems that most frequently trigger EITC 
audits tend to fall within common niches—such as proof of a qualifying child under 
EITC criteria—thus diminishing the breadth of material to learn.
240
  Moreover, a number 
of LSC grantees have recently started or expanded foreclosure representation practices in 
response to burgeoning demand for such services as a result of the recent housing crisis.  
This illustrates the ability of legal aid groups to adapt quickly to meet client needs, and to 
do so in a relatively complicated area of the law.  
Even if the legal aid groups were to expand deeper into tax representation, 
individual legal aid offices would be required to spend at least 12.5% of their basic field 
grants to recruit and assist private attorneys to represent low income taxpayer clients, 
usually on a pro bono basis.
241
  More than ten percent of the cases closed in 2007 were 
assisted by pro bono attorneys.
242
  LSC grantees are under no obligation to allocate 
private attorney-related funding toward any specific field, but if they targeted low-income 
tax representations with some of those resources, it would help increase the visibility of 
EITC representation in the professional tax community, and especially in the eyes of 
private firms looking for pro bono opportunities.  Firms can give special bonuses to 
associate hires with tax clinic experience, allow associates to participate directly in 




D. The Civil Gideon Movement and the EITC 
Although the Supreme Court found a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel 
in criminal cases in the landmark 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court denied 
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a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases in the 1981 decision Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services.
244
  As a result, right to counsel in civil cases is a patchwork system 
with access for the indigent dependent on the available legal services and statutes in 
individual states.
245
  Currently, there are only three main categories of cases where most 
state statutes or court rules provide a right to counsel in civil matters: family law matters, 
involuntary commitment, and medical treatment.
246
  In fact, although individual states 
provide a right to counsel in a number of other specific situations (guaranteed counsel for 
military members, cases involving mental health records, and juvenile immigrant status 
actions, for example), not a single state has a statute or judicial opinion that provides a 
right to counsel in tax cases.
247
  This fact is not surprising in light of the “civil Gideon” 
movement’s core focus on courts. 
Given this emphasis on non-tax matters, the EITC audit process and Tax Court 
has not been an element of the current “civil Gideon” movement.
248
  The fact that 
representation during tax cases is largely left out of the civil Gideon movement is 
especially critical since many commentators have argued that the movement is better 
positioned to make gains since the Lassiter decision in 1981.
249
  One major development 
in the last decade is the American Bar Association’s 2006 resolution that endorsed 
providing “counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons 
in . . . adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those 
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody . . . .”
250
  As a result of this 
development, groups representing the American Bar Association are now able to file 
amicus briefs in cases that are seeking the right to counsel.
251
  Also, pilot legislation has 
been passed in California
252
 and proposed in New York to expand the right to counsel.
253
  
In addition to these statutory and ABA initiatives, there is also progress in state 
court systems toward a guaranteed right to counsel in certain situations.  In 2007, an 
Alaska trial court held that the state constitution created a right to counsel for a parent in 
a custody action when the other parent has private counsel; in 2009, a Washington Court 
of Appeals held that children have a due process right to counsel in truancy 
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proceedings.
254
  However, these court-driven gains in civil representation, like their 
statutory and ABA analogues, wholly omit tax assistance from their ambit. 
Addressing the need for civil Gideon in the context of the EITC is more 
complicated than simply asserting that the right to representation during the IRS audit 
process and U.S. Tax Court proceedings should be guaranteed and funded through 
government revenue.  As previously noted, the recent successes in expanding civil 
Gideon have not been achieved by constitutional arguments or expansion of federal 
programs.
255
  Instead, as one commentator has pointed out, the gains of the movement 
have primarily occurred when state legislatures believe that the proposal will have a net 
positive impact on the state’s budget, or when arguments about fundamental fairness are 




In the case of EITC claimants subject to audits, it may be possible to advance 
both rationales for extension of civil Gideon rights.  A fiscal case for free tax 
representation could be made if it can be documented, and demonstrated to legislatures, 
that providing counsel during the EITC auditing process and U.S. Tax Court proceedings 
will help to keep potential claimants from resorting to state-provided social services.  In 
addition to reducing reliance on state services, EITC recipients would presumably spend 
the bulk of their received funds on goods and services in their home state, boosting local 
economies as well as state sales tax receipts.  Although it has been extensively 
documented that EITC claimants with representation are more likely to preserve the 
benefit of the refund, whether those that are unsuccessful during the audit process are 
more likely to need expansive state benefits has not been studied.
257
  
As to the fundamental fairness rationale for the EITC, it is critical to note that a 
failed EITC audit can have drastic consequences for an EITC claimant.  The Tax Court 
case of Baker v. Commissioner illustrates the predicament of a taxpayer who has received 
the credit and is later deemed ineligible.
258
  Daniel Aaron Baker, whose income in the 
year he claimed the credit was $15,349 and who bore significant childcare expenses for 
his four-year-old daughter, was required to repay an assessment of $3,556 because he 
failed to establish that his daughter resided with him over the course of the relevant tax 
year.
259
  The entry of a $3,556 assessment against an individual with an annual income of 
$15,349 (who also had significant child care expenses) presumably had a disastrous 
financial impact.  Such dire ramifications—which one cannot assume are atypical—go to 
the heart of the ABA’s statement that “counsel as a matter of right at public expense” 
must be provided “to low income persons in . . . adversarial proceedings where basic 
human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or 
child custody . . . .”
 260
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In cases where legislatures have been persuaded by concerns of fundamental 
fairness, it has often been with the assistance of advocacy groups.
261
  Although some of 
these groups (such as parental advocacy organizations) have been distinct from the legal 
aid movement, the most common group of advocates has been lawyers associated with 
the legal aid movement.
262
  This includes “civil right to counsel advocates, civil legal aid 
attorneys, and bar associations.”
263
  For EITC claimants, this fact offers some hope.  
Since there are over 500,000 audits of EITC claimants each year,
264
 there would be a 
great deal to gain for attorneys if legislatures were convinced that EITC claimants should 
have a government-funded right to counsel during auditing process and Tax Court 
proceedings.  As a result, the civil Gideon movement, and lawyers advocating for 
increased representation, should take up the entirely reasonable argument that it is 
normatively unjust to force low income individuals to self-certify that they are eligible to 
America’s largest welfare program through an exceedingly complex tax return, only to be 
forced to defend themselves without assistance when they make a mistake, and often lose 
the benefit for lack of representation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The EITC’s administrative vacuum makes it more onerous for low-income 
taxpayers to navigate than traditional welfare programs.  In this article, we have 
discussed and analyzed a number of reforms—both internal reforms to the IRS and 
external initiatives for the legal aid community—that could help soften the program’s 
harsh edge.  While some of these reforms may require increased Congressional funding at 
a time when budgets are being slashed across the board, such funding generally pales in 
comparison to the $10 billion in erroneous payments made under the EITC each year.  If 
the program’s tax-based administration can justify the diversion of such significant 
resources to non-compliant taxpayers, surely it is appropriate to devote far more modest 
sums to assist qualifying taxpayers in claiming the benefit to which they are entitled.   
The proposals in this article should be considered individually.  Each stands to 
provide unique benefits, and may well have unique costs as well.  What is important is 
not so much that any one of these proposals be adopted, but to recognize that the EITC’s 
tax-based administration raises a number of normative concerns in regard to the 
program’s treatment of low-income taxpayers, and to begin a discussion about how those 
normative concerns might be addressed.  Those concerned with providing legal aid to 
low-income Americans must see the “hidden welfare state” for what it is—a prominent, 
and often problematic reality for millions of low-income Americans—and take action 
accordingly. 
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